Residency Requirements for City Employees: Important Incentives in Today’s Urban Crisis by Hager, Connie M.
Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
Volume 18
January 1980
Residency Requirements for City Employees:
Important Incentives in Today’s Urban Crisis
Connie M. Hager
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more
information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Connie M. Hager, Residency Requirements for City Employees: Important Incentives in Today’s Urban Crisis, 18 Urb. L. Ann. 197 (1980)
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol18/iss1/6
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR CITY
EMPLOYEES: IMPORTANT INCENTIVES
IN TODAY'S URBAN CRISIS
Connie M. Hager*
Two hundred years after colonization, the United States continues
to be a remarkably mobile society. Migration patterns, as well as
public reaction to the gasoline shortage, make it apparent that Ameri-
cans appreciate and cherish their right to travel throughout the coun-
try. This constant redistribution of the population is far from
random, however. While demonstrating the so-called "right" each
person has to live where he chooses, Americans are abandoning the
central cities in ever-increasing numbers.'
Since free movement of persons has developed into a constitution-
ally protected fundamental right to travel,' few legal restrictions may
Attorney, Team Four, Inc., St. Louis, Mo.; B.A., University of Missouri at St.
Louis, 1976., J.D., Washington University, 1979.
1. According to statistics, Americans no longer wish to live in the central cities but
prefer suburbia. During the 1960's, the central cities gained 5.3% in population while
the surrounding areas grew by 28.2%. Only the population of nine of the 20 largest
cities increased during the decade. Except for New York, which showed a 1% gain,
all of the major cities of the North and East lost more residents than they added. For
a fine summary of this trend, see Costello, The Future of the City in EDITORIAL RE-
SEARCH REPORTS ON THE FUTURE OF THE CITY 3-7 (1974).
2 Although the courts have recognized a constitutional right to travel for many
years, the source of that right remains unclear. In the Passengers Cases, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 283 (1849), the Supreme Court traced the right to the commerce clause; in
Ward v. Maryland, 789 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870), to the privileges and immunities
clause: in Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) to the Fifth Amendment; and to no
particular constitutional provision in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). For
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be imposed on its exercise.' Nevertheless, municipal governments
nationwide have infringed on this right to travel by establishing resi-
dency requirements for their city employees since the earliest city
charters. As a consequence of this encroachment, these provisions
have been the source of extensive constitutional litigation, primarily
on equal protection grounds.'
Typically, restricted public employees and legal commentators de-
nounce this deprivation of a right so fundamental.' These advocates
a brief discussion of the historical search for the source of the right to travel, see
Comment, A Strict Scrutiny of the Right to Travel, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1129, 1140-45
(1975).
3. The courts have actively invalidated any restrictions which unconstitutionally
interfere with the right each citizen has to move from state to state. Many residency
requirements that require a new resident to endure a "waiting period" before receiv-
ing some benefit have been struck down. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (free medical care); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330
(1972) (voting); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (voting); King v. New
Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971) (federally financed low-cost
housing); Cole v. Housing Auth., 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970) (public housing);
Barnes v. Board of Trustees, 369 F. Supp. 1327 (W.D. Mich. 1973 (veterans' benefits);
Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Miss. 1971) (state bar examination);
Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D.N.C. 1971) (therapeutic abortions);
Vaughan v. Bower, 313 F. Supp. 37 (D. Ariz.), afid, 400 U.S. 884 (1970) (commit-
ment to state mental hospital). But see Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), in which
the court upheld a five-year residency requirement for aliens to qualify for Medicare.
4. Lawmakers frequently impose residency requirements through city charter pro-
visions. E.g., ST. Louis, MISSOURI, CODE art. VIII, § 2 (1976). Municipalities also
establish mandatory residence through Civil Service Commission rules. See, e.g.,
NASHVILLE, TENN., CIVIL SERV. COMM'N RULES ch. 5, § 1 (1972); and city ordi-
nances, e.g., DETROIT, MICH., ORDINANCE No. 327-G (June 6, 1968).
5. Municipal residency requirements have not always been subjected to constitu-
tional challenge. The earliest attacks turned on technical defects in the provisions.
For a good summary of this approach, see Note, Residency Requirementsfor MunicpaI
Employees. Denial ofa Right to Commute? 7 U.S.F. L. REV. 508, 511-15 (1973).
6. See note 16 and accompanying text infra for an explanation of those rights
deemed "fundamental."
The legal commentators have unanimously decided that municipal residency re-
quirements infringe on an individual's right to travel to such an extent as to render
them unconstitutional. See, e.g., Note, Residency Requirementsfor Municipal E11p/o;-
ees: Denial of a Right to Commute? 7 U.S.F. L. REv. 508 (1973); Note, Municipal
Employees Residency Requirements & Equal Protection, 84 YALE L.J. 1684 (1975);
Comment, The Constitutionality ofResidency Requirementsfor Municpal Enployees,
24 EMORY L.J. 447 (1975); Comment, Municipal Residency Requirements: Constitu-
tional & Collective Bargaining.4spects, 52 J. URBAN L. 767 (1975); Comment, A Strict
Scrutiny ofthe Right to Travel, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1129 (1975); Comment, Constitu-
tional Law: New Distastefor Equal Protection Analysis, 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 839
(1975); Comment, City Employment Residency Requirements, 7 URBAN L. ANN. 414
[Vol. 18:197
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol18/iss1/6
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS
of the constitutional right to commute contend that public employ-
ment cannot demand contractual surrender of such a basic freedom.
When the present condition of older American cities is taken into
account, though, new considerations arise that must be resolved in
favor of the city. Confronted with the legitimacy of residency re-
quirements, it now is appropriate to weigh the crisis of the cities
against restrictions on a fundamental personal right. The courts
should not eliminate one of the few remaining incentives to live in
the city--employment.
Initially, this Note examines the judicial challenges to residency
requirements, evaluating the individual interests at stake. After re-
viewing these personal rights, the Note then focuses on municipal
interests involved in establishing residency provisions. The signifi-
cance of this examination, however, will be found in the urban crisis
context that must control when studying the residency problem in
1980. Residency requirements are a municipal issue which cannot be
dealt with fairly in an abstract constitutional setting alone. Ulti-
mately, the Note discusses significant governmental interests in sav-
ing the American city that justify curtailment of the constitutional
right to travel.
I. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
TO RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS
Although municipal employees forced to live within city limits as a
condition of their employment have attacked these provisions as vio-
lations of due process7 and the privileges and immunities clause,8
(1974). Comment, Municipal Employee Residence Requirements & the Right to Travel,
1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 250; Comment, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Penalty
on the Right to Travel-Durational Residency Requirements, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 914.
7. In Williams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 383 Mich. 507, 176 N.W.2d 593 (1970),
municipal employees interested in relocating outside city limits challenged a resi-
dency requirement as a violation of substantive due process. Although the state court
of appeals found the requirement a violation, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed.
Because the civil service rule was not arbitrary or irrational and was reasonably re-
lated to the municipal interest of promoting better government, the court upheld the
requirement. The court concluded that there is no constitutional right to work for the
City of Detroit while living elsewhere. 383 Mich. at 512, 176 N.W.2d at 597.
8. In Construction & General Laborers, Local 563 v. City of St. Paul, 270 Minn.
427, 134 N.W.2d 26 (1965), union members successfully challenged the validity of a
residency requirement under the privileges and immunities clause. In this case, a St.
Paul city ordinance compelled all contractors who were performing work for the city
to employ only Ramsey County residents. The city claimed no direct authority to
enact such an ordinance, but relied upon derivative authority from the police powers
19801
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equal protection has become the most viable means of objection.' In
the majority of cases, the arguments are similar: a public employee
alleges that every citizen has the right to live where he chooses and to
travel freely within and across state borders. The aggrieved worker
then argues that state and federal constitutions guarantee that such
movement is a fundamental right.' These constitutions also provide
each citizen equal protection of the laws. Discrimnation against non-
residents denies that protection, and thereby encroaches on the fun-
damental right to travel freely."
The courts, responding to equal protection claims, must determine
how closely to scrutinize residency requirements. Generally, in the
absence of harm or threat of harm to a "fundamental" right, courts
apply the "traditional" equal protection standard to a disputed regu-
lation.'2 This traditional or "minimum scrutiny" test allows statutory
discrimination "if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to
justify it."' 3 A violation of equal protection will be found "only if the
classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of
and its home rule charter to legitimize the regulation. 270 Minn. at 430, 134 N.W.2d
at 30.
9. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the protection of equal treatment
under the laws: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV.
10. More than 20 cases have used an equal protection approach to residency.
Donnelly v. City of Manchester, 111 N.H. 50, 51-52, 274 A.2d 789, 791-92 (1971),
contains a piece-by-piece equal protection analysis.
11. Only a minority of courts have found the right of intrastate travel to be "fun-
damental." See, e.g., Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492, 498 (D.N.J. 1972);
Donnelly v. City of Manchester, 111 N.H. 50, 274 A.2d 789 (1971). See also
Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 65 NJ. 61, 77, 319 A.2d 483, 491 (1974) (Pashman,
J., dissenting). While the right to travel is generally the only fundamental right courts
confront in residency, plaintiff in Hanson v. Unified School Dist., 364 F. Supp. 330
(D. Kan. 1973) urged the fundamental rights "to work" and "to live where one
chooses."
12. For an excellent discussion of equal protection standards, see L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 994-1011 (1978). This is a fairly simplified expla-
nation of each test's appropriateness in various constitutional problems.
13. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961). The traditional equal
protection test has been articulated by the Supreme Court on several occasions. See,
e.g., Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilots Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947); Metropolitan
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580 (1935); Lindlsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U.S. 61 (1911); Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96 (1899).
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the State's objective."' 4 In practice, courts interpret this standard to
require a rational relationship between the end sought to be accom-
plished and the means used to achieve that end.' 5
Although courts frequently apply the traditional minimum scru-
tiny standard in equal protection cases, the test is inappropriate in
some situations. When the discrimination legitimized by the regula-
tion adversely affects "fundamental"' 6 constitutional rights, the ap-
plicable test is much more stringent. Under those circumstances, the
court will uphold the statute only if the state demonstrates a compel-
ling interest in maintaining the differencne in treatment between the
classes.' 7 Therefore, in applying strict scrutiny to residency require-
ments, the court will approve such ordinances only when a compel-
ling governmental interest justifies the discrimination against non-
residents and the deprivation of employees' rights to travel freely.
Because of the significant difference in the two equal protection
14. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961). For a discussion of the
minimum scrutiny test of equal protection, see Note, Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1076-87 (1969).
15. In the residency context, courts frequently have explained the minimum scru-
tiny standard as a rational relationship test. See, e.g., Cole v. Housing Auth., 435
F.2d 807, 813 (1st Cir. 1970); Ector v. City of Torrance, 28 Cal. App. 3d 293, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 594 (Ct. App. 1972), rev'd, 10 Cal. 3d 129, 134, 514 P.2d 433, 436, 109 Cal. Rptr.
849, 852 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974); Hattiesburg Firefighters Local 184
v. City of Hattiesburg, 263 So. 2d 767, 771 (Miss. 1972); Detroit Police Officers Ass'n
v. City of Detroit, 385 Mich. 519, 522, 190 N.W.2d 97, 97 (1971), appeal dismissedfor
lack of substantialfederal question, 405 U.S. 950 (1972); Construction & General La-
borers Local 563 v. City of St. Paul, 270 Minn. 427, 435, 134 N.W.2d 26, 31-32 (1965).
16. Among the rights that have been declared fundamental in equal protection
analysis are the right to travel, Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250
(1974); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1972); equal access to voting, Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); and procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942). See general';' San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 30-36 nn.74-76 (1973); Note, Fundamental Personal Rights: Another Approach to
Equal Protection, 40 U. CHi. L. REV. 807 (1973).
Among the rights that have been declared fundamental in due process analysis are
the right to be free of restrictive maternity leave regulations that burden "the freedom
of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life," Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); the right to terminate a pregnancy (encom-
passed within the right to privacy), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); and the "rights
to conceive and raise one's children," Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
17 The Supreme Court has applied the strict scrutiny test in various contexts.
See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage as an inherently sus-
pect class), Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (fundamental right to travel);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (free exercise of religion); Bates v. City of
Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (freedom of association).
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tests, the threshold question is whether the Constitution affords the
right to travel fundamental status. As is true with most of the issues
involved in residency requirements, the courts have been unable to
reach a consensus.' 8
II. THE FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL
Historically, the right to travel was treated as a right derived from
the commerce clause.1 9 In a landmark case on residency require-
ments, Shapiro v. Thompson,2" the Supreme Court in 1969 finally ac-
knowledged that a right to travel exists independently of the
commerce clause.21 In Shapiro, the Court struck down a one-year
durational residency period required for state welfare eligibility.22
The Supreme Court, quoting from an earlier decision, stated "in any
event, freedom to travel throughout the United States has long been
recognized as a basic right under the Constitution."23 Later, the Sha-
piro court noted, ". . . in moving from State to State or to the Dis-
trict of Columbia appellees were exercising a constitutional right, and
any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right,
unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental
interest, is unconstitutional."'24
A cursory analysis of Shapiro suggests that the decision settled
18. Several lower federal and state decisions have used a fundamental constitu-
tional right to travel to protect intrastate movement. See, e.g., King v. New Rochelle
Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971); Cole v. Housing Auth., 435 F.2d 807
(1st Cir. 1970); Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1972); Donnelly v,
City of Manchester, 111 N.H. 50, 274 A.2d 789 (1971); Josephine County School Dist.
v. Oregon School Activities Ass'n, 15 Ore. App. 185, 515 P.2d 431 (1973); Eggert v.
City of Seattle, 81 Wash. 2d 840, 505 P.2d 801 (1973).
Nevertheless, the majority of courts have been unable to find a fundamental right
of intrastate travel. E.g., Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 385 Mich.
519, 190 N.W.2d 97 (1971), appeal dismissedfor lack of substantial federal question,
405 U.S. 950 (1972); Mogle v. Sevier County School Dist., 540 F.2d 478 (10th Cir.
1976); Wardwell v. Board of Educ., 529 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1976); Wright v. City of
Jackson, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1975); Miller v. Krawczyk, 414 F. Supp. 998 (E.D.
Wis. 1976); Pittsburgh Fed'n of Teachers v. Aaron, 417 F. Supp. 94 (W.D. Penn.
1976); Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal. 3d 129, 109 Cal. Rptr. 849, 514 P.2d 433
(1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974).
19. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
20. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
21. Id. at 630 n.8.
22. Id. at 641-42.
23. Id. at 631, quoting from United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966).
24. 394 U.S. at 634 (emphasis in original).
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both residency requirement issues. First, the court treated the right to
travel as fundamental. Second, it examined the fundamental right to
travel using strict scrutiny. A closer look reveals, however, that Sha-
piro held that strict scrutiny only protected inter-state travel as a fun-
damental right." The question paramount in municipal residency
requirements is whether the same determinations apply to intra-state
travel.
Unfortunately, the courts are divided on this important issue. In
the courts of appeals, the First and Second Circuits have concluded
that intrastate travel is indeed fundamental.26 Reaching the opposite
result, the Sixth Circuit decided that the right exists only for inter-
state migration.27 The federal district and state courts are also split
over the distinction.2
8
Several courts avoid the intra/inter differentiation completely,
29
including the most recent Supreme Court case on residency, McCar-
thr v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n.31 In McCarthy, the Court up-
held a Philadelphia ordinance that required residency as a condition
of municipal employment. While the Court found no violation of the
25 The Supreme Court has never decided that the fundamental right to travel
protected by the Constitution extends to movement entirely within a state. Most
courts have therefore been hesitant in finding an intrastate right. See, e.g., Ector v.
City of Torrance. 10 Cal. 3d 129, 514 P.2d 433, 436, 109 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1973), where
the court stated: "[A]ppellant is claiming the right to 'travel' between his home and
his place of employment . . . each working day-in other words, a 'right to com-
mute' We cannot discern such a right in the United States Supreme Court deci-
sions." Nevertheless, recent dictum indicates that an intrastate right may exist. See
Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 256 n.9 (1974).
26. The First Circuit found a fundamental right of intrastate travel in Cole v.
Housing Auth., 435 F.2d 807, 811 (Ist Cir. 1970). One year later the Second Circuit
chose to agree with Cole in King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646,
648 (2d Cir. 1971).
27. Wardwell v. Board of Educ., 529 F.2d 625, 627 (6th Cir. 1976).
28 The majority of lower courts have not recognized intrastate travel as a funda-
mental right. See. e.g., Pittsburgh Fed'n of Teachers v. Aaron, 417 F. Supp. 94 (W.D.
Penn. 1976); Miller v. Krawczyk, 414 F. Supp. 998 (E.D. Wis. 1976); Conway v. City
of Kenosha, 409 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Hattiesburg Firefighters Local 184
v City of Hattiesburg, 263 So. 2d 767 (Miss. 1972). But see Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338
F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1972); Donnelly v. City of Manchester, I ll N.H. 50, 274 A.2d
789 (1971l
29 See. e.g., Andre v. Board of Trustees, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1977); Mogle v.
Sevier County School Dist., 540 F.2d 478 (10th Cir. 1976); Wright v. City of Jackson,
506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1975).
30. 424 U.S. 645 (1976) (per curiam).
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constitutionally protected right of interstate travel,31 the opinion con-
tains no discussion of intrastate travel or the applicable equal protec-
tion tests.
At the court of appeals level, the first two circuits to deal with in-
trastate migration concluded, in keeping with Shapiro, that the right
is fundamental. The First Circuit in Cole v. Housing Authori y of
Newport32 invalidated a two-year residence requirement imposed on
applicants for admission to federally aided, low-rent public housing
projects.33 Finding a violation of equal protection, the court ex-
plained that the right to travel is a fundamental personal right which
can be impinged34 only when necessary to promote a compelling gov-
ernmental interest.35 The ordinance in Cole failed to reflect such an
interest.36 Interpreting Shapiro later in the opinion, the First Circuit
stated, "The [Supreme] Court apparently uses 'travel' in the sense of
migration with intent to settle and abide."37 Since both inter- and
intra-state migration would qualify as "travel" within this definition,
the fundamental right must encompass both types of movement.
Consequently, this court applies strict scrutiny to intrastate travel.
One year later in King v. New Rochelle Municioal Housing Author-
ity,38 the Second Circuit struck down a five-year durational residency
requirement for admission to public housing as a violation of equal
protection.39 Although the logic in King is consistent with the Cole
interpretation of Shapiro, the King court stated its position on the
intra/inter dilemma more definitively:
[W]e do not believe that the use of the term "interstate" in Sha-
piro was anything more than a reflection of the state-wide enact-
ments involved in that case. Indeed, the Supreme Court
specifically refused to ascribe the source of the right to travel to a
particular constitutional provision but relied on "our constitu-
tional concepts of personal liberty." It would be meaningless to
3 I. Id. at 647.
32. 435 F.2d 807 (lst Cir. 1970).
33. Id. at 814.
34. In this context, the court considered "impinged" to be a neutral term. The
First Circuit stressed the dispute over the point when interference with travel neces-
sarily impinges that right. Id. at 809 n.7.
35. Id. at 809.
36. Id. at 811-13.
37. Id. at 811.
38. 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971).
39. Id. at 649.
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describe the right to travel between states as a fundamental pre-
cept of personal liberty and not to acknowledge a correlative
constitutional right to travel within a state.n
From 1971 until 1976, the courts of appeals were silent on the
question of intrastate travel as a fundamental right, though residency
requirements were prompting extensive litigation. In Wardwell v.
Board of Education4 the Sixth Circuit broke the silence. A school
teacher in Cincinnati challenged the constitutionality of a rule requir-
ing all teachers hired after a given date to establish residence within
the school district before ninety days elapsed.42 Finding "no support
for plaintiffs theory that the right to intrastate travel has been af-
forded federal constitutional protection, ' 43 the court upheld the va-
lidity of the rule.44 Further, the court explained that when dealing
with a continuing employee residency requirement which will only
affect the right of intrastate travel, the test for validity is minimum
scrutiny/rational basis n.4  The court did not require a compelling
state interest in this case to affirm the constitutionality of the resi-
dency requirement.
The district and state courts illustrate the same confusion exper-
ienced in the appeals courts. Lacking a definitive answer on the
question of fundamental rights, the courts have rather arbitrarily
chosen between minimum and strict scrutiny.46 To date, the chal-
lenges evaluated with strict scrutiny have produced decisions going
both ways.47 Similarly, when courts apply the rationality test of min-
40 ld at 648 (citations and footnote omitted).
41 529 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1976).
42 Id. at 626-27.
43 Id. at 627.
44 Id. at 629.
45 Id. at 628. In this context, the court concluded that the compelling govern-
mental interest test would be appropriate if the case involved a durational residency
requirement infringing on the fundamental right of interstate travel. However, in the
case of a continuing requirement affecting intrastate travel at the most, the less strin-
gent standard is applicable. See notes 110-13 and accompanying text infra.
46. The courts that have used the rationality test of minimum scrutiny fall into
two classifications: a) those that fail to see intrastate travel as a constitutionally pro-
tected fundamental right, see note 28 and accompanying text supra; and b) those that
ignore the intrastate/interstate issue altogether, see note 29 and accompanying text
supra. The courts that have applied the strict scrutiny test have found a fundamental
right of intrastate travel. Eg. ., Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1972);
Donnelly v. City of Manchester, I I l N.H. 50, 274 A.2d 789 (1971).
47 In Donnelly v. City of Manchester, Ill N.H. 50, 274 A.2d 789 (1971), the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that although no constitutional right to work
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48imum scrutiny, the decisions have been far from unanimous.
III. THE SEARCH FOR RATIONAL MUNICIPAL INTERESTS:
MINIMUM SCRUTINY
Under either the minimum or strict scrutiny tests, courts must
choose between the governmental and personal interests at stake. In
the first case to fully explore the constitutional issues in residency,
Kennedy v. City of Newark,49 the New Jersey Supreme Court applied
minimum scrutiny and upheld a continued employment residency re-
quirement because of the city's legitimate interests.50 Returning to an
archaic argument that public employment is a "privilege" and not a
"right,"'51 the New Jersey Supreme Court perceived a rational basis
in the public policy advanced by the provisions. The court stated,
"The question is not whether a man is free to live where he will.
Rather the question is whether he may live where he wishes and at
for the city exists, the privilege of working for the municipality could not be condi-
tioned upon the surrender of a citizen's fundamental right to live where he chooses.
The ordinance failed to survive strict scrutiny. In Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp.
492 (D.N.J. 1972), however, a residency requirement for police and firemen passed
the strict scrutiny of the district court of New Jersey.
48. Under the rationality test of minimum scrutiny, the majority of residency re-
strictions have been upheld. See, e.g., Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit,
385 Mich. 519, 190 N.W.2d 97 (1971), appeal dismissedfor lack of substantialfederal
question, 405 U.S. 950 (1972); Hattiesburg Firefighters Local 184 v. City of Hatties-
burg, 263 So. 2d 767 (Miss. 1972); Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 65 N.J. 61, 319
A.2d 483 (1974); Kennedy v. City of Newark, 29 N.J. 178, 148 A.2d 473 (1959); Salt
Lake City Firefighters Local 1645 v. Salt Lake City, 22 Utah 2d 115, 449 P.2d 239
(1969).
Several residency requirements, however, have been unable to satisfy the rational-
ity test. For example, in Construction & General Laborers Local 563 v. City of St.
Paul, 270 Minn. 427, 134 N.W.2d 26 (1965), a union sued the city because of an
ordinance that forced all contractors working for the city to hire only county resi-
dents. The court found no rational explanation for the discrimination against nonres-
idents.
In another case, State, County & Municipal Employees Local 339 v. City of High-
land Park, 363 Mich. 79, 108 N.W.2d 898 (1961), the court found unconstitutional a
city residency requirement that applied to 163 nonresident employees for whom no
living facilities were available within corporate limits. The municipality failed to
demonstrate a sufficient justification for the ordinance under minimum scrutiny.
49. 29 N.J. 178, 148 A.2d 473 (1959).
50. Id. at 183-84, 148 A.2d at 476.
51. Id. For an excellent analysis of the right/privilege dichotomy both pre- and
post-Shapiro, see Note, Residency Requirementsfor Municipal Employees: Denial of a
Right to Commute? 7 U.S.F. L. REv. 508, 523-26 (1973). See also Comment, City
Employment Residency Requirements, 7 URBAN L. ANN. 414, 417-18 (1974).
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the same time insist upon employment by government."52 Although
state courts articulated the right/privilege dichotomy for many years
in this context, the Shapiro Court later completely discredited this
theory.53
Ten years after the Kennedy decision, in 1969, another landmark
residency case involved minimum scrutiny as applied to an equal
protection dispute. The Utah Supreme Court, in Salt Lake City
Firefighters Local 1645 v. Salt Lake City,54 determined that the city
had the power to require the residency of appointed officers and city
employees." In this case, the majority satisfied the rationality test by
urging the soundness of geographical proximity arguments.56 Addi-
tionally, the court agreed that the city was entitled to residential sup-
port and taxes in exchange for providing jobs, food and clothing for
those same employees.57 Today, most courts believe this argument,
52. 29 N.J. at 183-84, 148 A.2d at 476.
53. Accord, Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 361 (1976); Leger v. Sailer, 321 F. Supp.
250 (ED. Pa. 1970), afdsub nom. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Don-
nelly v. City of Manchester, Il1 N.H. 50, 274 A.2d 789 (1971). The New Jersey
courts, however, continue to accept the contention that public employment is not a
nght, but a privilege which the government may bestow. See, e.g., Mercadante v.
City of Paterson, 111 N.J. Super. 35, 266 A.2d 611 (Chan. Div. 1970), affid, 58 N.J.
112, 275 A.2d 440 (1971); Kennedy v. City of Newark, 29 N.J. 178, 148 A.2d 473
(1959).
54. 22 Utah 2d 115, 449 P.2d 239 (1969).
55. Id. at 116-17, 449 P.2d at 239-40.
56. Accord, Hattiesburg Firefighters Local 184 v. City of Hattiesburg, 263 So. 2d
767 (Miss. 1972). Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 385 Mich. 519, 190
N.W.2d 97 (1971), appeal dismissedfor lack of substantial federal question, 405 U.S.
950 (1972). When police and fire departments challenge the residency requirements,
proximity to employment becomes an especially persuasive municipal argument. The
emergency nature of the jobs, however, has not produced decisions that allow the
employee to live closer to work yet outside city limits. For an argument that a time or
radius computation would be more rational and efficient than arbitrary city limits, see
Comment, Citr Employment Resideney Requirements, 7 URBAN L. ANN. 414 (1974).
57. We have difficulty in concluding other than that any employer, including a
city, should be able to draw from labor pool those who live within a reasonable
distance from work, or, if you please, within the city limits. This not only for the
city's convenience and economical operation, but conceivably to have those
whom it helps clothe and feed participate in and contribute support and taxes for
its benefit,-not for that of cities elsewhere.
It is conceded that there will be cases of hardship and inconvenience for some
in order to continue their employment with the City, which is regrettable, but we
cannot subscribe to the theory of counsel that place of residence is a God-given,
constitutional right, determinable and enforceable by an employee against his
employer who offers and gives the employee his job, unless such right contractu-
ally is protected.
1980]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
commonly known as the "public coffer" theory, lacks merit in light of
Shapiro. 58
While municipalities assert the public coffer and familiarity with
the city theories as defenses in almost all cases on residency require-
ments,59 additional justifications abound when police and firemen
challenge these provisions. The most noteworthy case, Detroit Police
Officers Alssociation v. City of Detroit,60 again applied the minimum
scrutiny test and upheld the ordinance.6 I Searching only for a rea-
sonable relationship between the object of the legislation and the resi-
dent/nonresident classification, the court found that several
legitimate interests would be advanced. The Michigan Supreme
Court acknowledged that a special relationship exists between police
officers and the community they patrol. Further, a policeman's pres-
ence in the city-both on- and off-duty-assures residents that a spe-
cially trained person would be available immediately if law
enforcement proves necessary.62
As an additional governmental interest, the court recognized the
22 Utah 2d at 117, 449 P.2d at 240.
58. The "public coffer" theory refers to the philosophy recognizing a mutual sup-
port obligation between a city and its employees. According to the court in Krzewin-
ski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1972), Shapiro renders this theory
constitutionally unsound. The court stated:
The "public coffer" theory states that the salaries paid to civil servants ought to
recirculate within the economy of the municipality that pays those salaries, In
this way, municipal funds are preserved for a municipality's own residents. But
this theory, as best expressed in People v. Crane (citation omitted), was sharply
rejected by the Supreme Court in Shapiro v. Thompson, supra. Municipalities
may not tie economic benefits in with contributions made to the municipal econ-
omy.
338 F. Supp. at 498-99 n.4. Other municipal residency cases have also rejected the
public coffer theory. See Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal. 3d 129, 514 P.2d 433, 109
Cal. Rptr. 849 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974); Donnelly v. City of
Manchester, I ll N.H. 50, 274 A.2d 789 (1971).
59. See, e.g., Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 65 N.J. 61, 319 A.2d 483 (1974);
Hanson v. United School Dist., 364 F. Supp. 330 (D. Kan. 1973); Kennedy v. City of
Newark, 29 N.J. 178, 148 A.2d 473 (1959); Salt Lake City Firefighters Local 1645 v.
Salt Lake City, 22 Utah 2d 115, 449 P.2d 239, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
60. 385 Mich. 519, 190 N.W.2d 97 (1971), appeal dismissedfor lack of substantial
federal question, 405 U.S. 950 (1972).
61. 385 Mich. at 536, 190 N.W.2d at 104-05.
62. Policemen are required by department order to be armed at all times, and
why is this? Simply because by such requirement they are, no matter where they
are or what they are doing, immediately prepared to perform their duties. They
are charged with law enforcement in the city of Detroit, and obviously must be
physically present to perform their duties. The police force is a semi-military
[Vol. 18:197
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol18/iss1/6
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS
tenuous relationship between the black community in Detroit and the
police force.63 The city argued that an ordinance which increases
daily contact between the citizenry and the police would promote its
interest in establishing a more cooperative attitude. The majority
agreed that a rational relationship existed.6 4 While this legislation
might increase the difficulty of recruiting and keeping police officers,
it would "make recruitment of black officers more imperative."65 Be-
cause the court recognized such recruitment as a positive goal, De-
troit demonstrated a legitimate interest in police/community
relations sufficient to justify infringement on the policeman's consti-
tutional right to travel.
Beyond the familiarity, public coffer, and concern for the commu-
nity contentions, courts have accepted many other arguments in sup-
port of the rational relationship. These municipal interests have not
been accepted in all courts, however. In Ector v. City of Torrance,66 a
1972 case subsequently reversed, the California Court of Appeals in-
validated a city charter provision requiring all municipal employees
to live within city limits.67 The court applied minimum scrutiny to
the ordinance and found a statutory violation of equal protection.
68
Following a New Hampshire Supreme Court case invalidating a sim-
organization subject at all times to immediate mobilization, which distinguishes
this type of employment from every other in the classified service.
Id. at 523, 190 N.W.2d at 98.
63. Id. at 524, 190 N.W.2d at 98.
64. "Special treatment of police residency puts them in the category [sic] of the
judges and other elected officials of the city. That classification is at least debatably
productive of proper municipal goals." Id. at 525, 190 N.W.2d at 98-99.
65. Id. at 524, 190 N.W.2d at 98. The question has often arisen as to the effect of
the Detroit Police Officers Assn appeal dismissal "for want of a substantial federal
question." Two courts have held the dismissal to be a binding decision on the merits
of the question whether the compelling state interest test should apply to employee
residence requirements. Ahern v. Murphy, 457 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1972); Ector v. City
of Torrance, 10 Cal. 3d 129, 514 P.2d 433, 104 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S 935 (1974). Commentators, however, have suggested that such a dismissal
should be considered merely persuasive rather than binding. See Note, The Signifi-
cance of Dismissals "'For Want of a Substantial Federal Question." Original Sin in the
Federal Courts, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 785, 790-92 (1968).
66. 28 Cal. App. 3d 293, 104 Cal. Rptr. 594 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
67. Id. at 297, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
68 Id. at 296, 104 Cal.Rptr. at 597-98. For a comment on this court of appeals
decision that protected the employee's right to travel, see Comment, City Employee
Residencv Requirements, 7 URBAN L. ANN. 414 (1974).
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ilar provision,69 the favorable treatment of residency requirements
under minimum scrutiny seemed threatened. Then, in the wake of
success for the right to commute, the California Supreme Court re-
versed the court of appeals.7" In its decision, the state supreme court
adopted every municipal interest argument that the city offered. The
residency requirement bore a rational relationship to many legitimate
state interests: reduction of residents' unemployment, promotion of
ethnic balance in the city, availability of trained manpower in emer-
gencies, reduction in employee tardiness and absenteeism, increased
quality of worker performance, and the city's economic benefit from
local expenditure of employees' salaries.7 ' Once again, however, not
all courts have responded favorably to these justifications.72
IV. THE SEARCH FOR COMPELLING MUNICIPAL INTERESTS:
STRICT SCRUTINY
While searching for legitimate municipal interests, courts in each
of the minimum scrutiny decisions supporting residence have over-
come two principal contentions by the challengers. First, the courts
decide that the individual's interest in his right to travel or commute
may be subordinated to the claims of the city.73 Second, the courts
determine that a municipality may choose to limit its labor pool,
thereby risking employment of less qualified persons.74 Because the
69. See Donnelly v. City of Manchester, Ill N.H. 50, 274 A.2d 789 (1971) in
which the court invalidated that portion of the residency requirement for all classified
city employees pertaining to teachers.
70. 10 Cal. 3d 129, 514 P.2d 433, 109 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
935 (1974).
71. Id. at 135, 514 P.2d at 436, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 852.
72. See, e.g., Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1972); State, County,
& Mun. Employees Local 339 v. City of Highland Park, 363 Mich. 79, 108 N.W.2d
898 (1961); Construction & General Laborers Local 563 v. City of St. Paul, 270 Minn.
427, 134 N.W.2d 26 (1965).
73. Under the minimum scrutiny test, the surrender of the constitutional right
must be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. Once the court confirms mu-
nicipal interests sufficient to justify the discrimination against nonresidents, the em-
ployee must live within city limits or risk losing his job.
74. Employees seeking relief from residency requirements generally claim that the
limited labor pool will result in unqualified personnel. Nevertheless, many courts
have found ways to justify residency in spite of such arguments. See, e.g., Marabuto
v. Town of Emeryville, 183 Cal. Ap. 2d 406, 6 Cal. Rptr. 690 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960)
(the object of a civil service system is to secure employees on the basis of their ability
to perform the duties of the job; an employee who cannot get to the job in time to
perform, when performance is demanded, is not qualified); Williams v. Civil Serv.
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courts applying minimum scrutiny do not confront resi-
dent/nonresident as a suspect classification impinging on fundamen-
tal individual rights, courts generally find the municipal interests
articulated sufficient to justify the requirement. In cases that presume
the fundamental nature of the right of intrastate travel, however,
courts discard the rationality test in lieu of strict scrutiny. To uphold
the constitutionality of residency under this standard, the municipal
interests must be compelling.75
Only two courts have found infringement of a fundamental consti-
tutional right in the bona fide continual residency requirement,76
which is the type of provision applicable to most city employees.
Due to this encroachment of a fundamental right, the courts sub-
jected the ordinances to strict scrutiny.77 In the first case, Donnely v.
City of Manchester,7" the majority held that the statute violated the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection.79 Conversely, the court
in Krzewinski v. Kugler8" upheld a residency requirement despite the
finding that intrastate travel qualified as a fundamental right.8
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire in Donnely invalidated an
ordinance requiring all classified city employees to become
Comm'n of Detroit, 383 Mich. 507, 176 N.W.2d 593 (1970) (stressed the fact that
residency is completely irrelevant to taking the civil service exam initially); Salt Lake
City Fire Fighters Local 1645 v. Salt Lake City, 22 Utah 2d 115, 449 P.2d 239, cert.
derned 395 U.S. 906 (1969) (any employer, including a city, could limit its labor pool
for convenience and economical operation).
75. Governmental action affecting fundamental rights does not enjoy a presump-
tion of constitutionality; rather, the burden is upon government to show a compelling
governmental interest justifying the intrusion. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 335 (1972) (right to vote); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627,
629 n 11, 633 (1969) (right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969)
(right to travel); De Gregory v. Attorney Gen. of N.H., 383 U.S. 825, 829 (1966) (right
to associate); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-407 (1963) (right to practice reli-
gion), Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963)
(right to associate); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) (right to associate);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958) (right to associate).
76. The bona fide continual residency requirement prohibits employees from liv-
ing outside city limits upon accepting employment with the municipality. By compar-
ison, a "'durational" residency requirement involves a waiting period before a person
becomes eligible for a designated benefit.
77. See notes 16-17 and accompanying text supra.
78. 111 N.H. 50, 274 A.2d 789 (1971).
79. Id. at 54, 274 A.2d at 792 (1971).
80 338 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1972).
81. Id. at 497-501.
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Manchester residents within twelve months of their employment.8"
Recognizing that each American has a fundamental right to travel
freely within and across state borders and live where he chooses,83
the court found no adequate justification. In this case, the court
weighed public benefit from the residency requirements against the
serious restriction on aprivate right.8 4 Ultimately, all the municipal
interests previously accepted under minimum scrutiny were insuffi-
cient to satisfy the stricter standard. 5
In 1972, one year after Donnel , the District Court of New Jersey
in Krzewinski v. Kugler86 upheld a city residence provision for police
and firemen. At the outset, the majority recognized a fundamental
right of intrastate travel in light of Shapiro.87 Following a lengthy
analysis, the Krzewinski court found a compelling governmental in-
terest to justify the constitutional infringement.8 8 However, the court
refused to accept typical municipal interests as advanced in the mini-
mum scrutiny cases. In the examination of the ordinance before it,
the court set aside the public coffer and right/privilege arguments
presented by the city.8 9
After discarding these doctrines, the court identified its perception
of the issue in residency requirements: "whether the interests of a
municipality in asking a policeman or fireman to surrender his con-
stitutional right to travel and migrate in exchange for his job are suffi-
82. 111 N.H. at 52, 274 A.2d at 790. To obtain a permit for noncompliance with
this ordinance, the employee was required to file a special request with the Board of
Mayor and Aldermen, based on certain permissible excuses.
83. Id. at 53, 274 A.2d at 791.
84. It is true. . . that there is no constitutional right to work for the city, but
this does not mean that the granting of this privilege may be conditioned upon a
surrender of a fundamental constitutional right. The old right-privilege distinc-
tion is no longer valid, (citations omitted), and discrimination against some in
public employment can no longer be practiced on the basis that the employment
is a privilege which can be withheld from all.
Id. at 54, 274 A.2d at 791-92.
85. Id. at 54, 274 A.2d at 792.
86. 338 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1972).
87. Id. at 499-501.
88. The court here accepted the determinations of the First and Second Circuits
that the right of intrastate travel was fundamental. Id. at 498. See note 26 and ac-
companying text supra. Further, the court said that the Supreme Court's refusal in
Shapiro to link the right to travel with any specific clause of the Constitution (394
U.S. at 630 n.8) supports the finding of a fundamental right.
89. 338 F. Supp. at 498 n.4.
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ciently compelling to justify the creation of a working class of
immobiles."' 9 To the surprise of courts and commentators, the opin-
ion affirmatively answered the question.9'
Within the framework of this issue, the Krzewinski court first ex-
amined the proximity argument. The majority admitted that the mu-
nicipal interest in having police and firemen close to their places of
employment would be adequate for the reasonableness standard. The
court decided, however, that this contention was not sufficiently com-
pelling. 2 Instead, the holding was based on a theory resembling the
"community identity" doctrine in the minimum scrutiny cases.93
Disregarding the familiar municipal arguments, the court presented
what it considered to be the legitimate interest behind residence re-
quirements, "the modem pattern of urban disruption and dissipation
prevalent today."94 This theory suggests that the public servant
could develop an unconscious disdain for the city and its residents if
permitted to live outside city limits. By spending his personal life in
the suburbs and only returning to the city to work, the public em-
ployee could develop a strong resentment toward the city resulting
from job-related tensions and emergencies. According to the New
Jersey court, the municipal employer has a compelling interest in
avoiding total disengagement between personal life and working
hours, thereby justifying encroachment on a right to commute.95
V. TREND: A NEW APPROACH TO EQUAL PROTECTION
Unfortunately, the District Court of New Jersey is the only court
which treated intrastate travel as fundamental, applied strict scrutiny,
and discovered a compelling governmental interest in support of
mandatory residence. Immediately after Krzewinski, the courts re-
turned to the minimum scrutiny approach after failing to perceive a
fundamental right. In the last four years, however, the courts have
chosen a new tactic for upholding residency post-Shapfiro.96
90 Id at 499.
91. Id. at 501.
92 Id. at 499 n.6.
93 See general// Mercadante v. City of Paterson, I ll N.J. Super. 35, 40, 266 A.2d
611. 614 (Chan. Div. 1970), aff'd, 58 N.J. 112, 275 A.2d 440 (1971), citing State v.
Benny, 20 N.J. 238, 252, 119 A.2d 155, 162 (1955).
94. 338 F. Supp. at 499.
95 Id. at 499-501.
96 See. e.g., McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976)
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The most recent decisions in this area simply stress the distinction
between "continuing" and "durational" residency.9 7 In contrast to
continuing requirements that prohibit employees from living outside
city limits while working for that municipality,98 durational require-
ments involve a "waiting period" before a person is eligible for some
benefit or right.9 9 The most common examples of the latter include
ordinances for medical and welfare benefits,' various licenses,"0 '
(per curiam); Andre v. Board of Trustees of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978); Mogle v. Sevier County School Dist., 540 F.2d 478
(10th Cir. 1976), cer. denied, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977); Wright v. City of Jackson, 506
F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1975).
97. See generally McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645
(1976) (per curiam); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Andre
v. Board of Trustees of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1013 (1978); Wardwell v. Board of Educ. of City School Dist., 529 F.2d 625 (6th Cir.
1976); Mogle v. Sevier County School Dist., 540 F.2d 478 (10th Cir. 1976), cer. de.
nied, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977); Wright v. City of Jackson, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1975).
98. Consider a typical example of a bona fide continuing residence requirement:
AN ORDINANCE REQUIRING ALL CITY EMPLOYEES UNDER
CIVIL SERVICE REGULATIONS TO MAINTAIN THEIR RESIDENCE
WITHIN THE CITY OF JACKSON.
BE IT ORDAINED BY THE MAYOR AND COMMISSIONERS OF THE
CITY OF JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI:
SECTION 1: All employees of the City of Jackson, Mississippi, qualified
under the rules and regulations of the Civil Service Commission, shall maintain
their domicile and principal place of residence within the corporate limits of said
City during the period of their employment with the City.
SECTION 2: Any person affected by the terms of this Ordinance who does
not now maintain his domicile and principal residence within the corporate lim-
its of the City of Jackson, Mississippi, shall move his domicile and principal
place of residence within the corporate limits of said City within a period of
twelve (12) months from the date of this Ordinance; and in the absence of such
compliance, said employee shall be immediately discharged and terminated in
his employment with the City of Jackson, Mississippi.
Jackson, Miss., Ordinance No. 3D (March 20, 1973).
99. Consider an example of a durational residency requirement:
Except in emergency cases when immediate hospitalization or medical care is
necessary for the preservation of life or limb no person shall be provided hospi-
talization, medical care or outpatient relief under the provisions of this article
without first filing ... that he is an indigent as shall be defined by rules and
regulations of the state department of economic security, an unemployable to-
tally dependent upon the state or county government for financial support, or an
employable of sworn low income without sufficient funds to provide himself nec-
essary hospitalization and medical care, and that he has been a resident of the
counltfor the preceding twelve months.
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § I 1-297A (Supp. 1978-79) (emphasis added).
100. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Valen-
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voting, 10 2 state bar admissions, 3 and free or reduced tuition rates.l14
Under the new approach, the Fifth,"°5 Sixth,10 6 Seventh,10 7 and
ciano v. Bateman, 323 F. Supp. 600 (D. Ariz. 1971); Arnold v. Halifax Hosp. Dist.,
314 F. Supp. 277 (M.D. Fla. 1970); Crapps v. Duval County Hosp. Auth., 314 F.
Supp. 181 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
101. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 n.21 (1969).
102. See. e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112 (1970).
103. See, e.g., Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Keenan
v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D. N.C. 1970); Webster v. Wofford,
321 F. Supp. 1259 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
104. See, e.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973); Arizona Bd. of Regents
v. Harper. 108 Ariz. 223, 495 P.2d 453 (1972).
105. In Wright v. City of Jackson, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1975), nonresident
firemen brought an action contesting the constitutionality of a Civil Service rule that
required all municipal employees to maintain their domicile and principal residence
within the corporate limits of the city during their employment. The court held that
the ordinance infringed on no constitutional right to intrastate travel and that the city
was not required to satisfy the compelling state interest standard. Emphasizing the
durational/continual distinction, the court required only rational interests here. The
Fifth Circuit stated, "We agree with the Supreme Court of California's analysis in
Ector Y. City of Torrance, that nothing in Shapiro or any of its progeny stands for the
proposition that there is a fundamental constitutional 'right to commute' which would
cause the compelling governmental purpose test enunciated in Shapiro to apply." Id.
at 902.
106. In Wardwell v. Board of Educ. of City School Dist., 529 F.2d 625 (6th Cir.
1976), a school teacher challenged a Board of Education rule requiring newly hired
teachers to establish residency in the school district within 90 days. Requiring only a
rational basis for the school board's residency requirement, the court held that the
right of intrastate travel is not protected by the federal Constitution. Further, the
court stated that the compelling state interest was applicable only in cases involving
the infringement of the right to interstate travel by durational residency requirements.
Id. at 627-28.
107. In Andre v. Board of Trustees of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978), employees contested the validity of a village ordinance
requiring residency by a specified date. The court found that the provision satisfied
the rationality test and upheld the ordinance. Referring to earlier Supreme Court
cases on durational residency requirements, the Seventh Circuit justified its choice of
equal protection tests:
The fact of residency itself was noted to be distinct from durational (or "waiting
period") residency in Shapiro (citations omitted) and only the latter was found to
be unconstitutional. Dunn "emphasize[d] again the difference between bona fide
residence requirements and durational residence requirements." (citations omit-
ted). In Memorial Hospital, quoting Dunn, the court cautioned that its decision
was not intended to "cast doubt on the appropriately defined and uniformly ap-
plied bona fide residence requirements" (citations omitted).
Id. at 52-53.
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Tenth ' 8 Circuits confine the holding of Shapiro, which requires a
compelling governmental interest, to durational residency only.19
According to this developing trend, the fundamental right of intra-
state travel does not exist in the context of continuing residency."o
The constitutionally protected right of intrastate migration must be
limited to durational residency only."' Since a continuing residency
ordinance fails to impinge on a fundamental right, the courts apply
minimum scrutiny to the legislative determination." 2 To the cities'
advantage, the most recent federal cases have found municipal inter-
ests to satisfy the less stringent equal protection test.' '
3
At this time, then, the prospects for maintaining the legitimacy of
residency requirements seem bright. Although this trend may disap-
point constitutional rights advocates with illusions of a fundamental
right to commute, older American cities desperately need judicial
support of these provisions. For municipal well-being, incentives
such as public employment must be preserved to halt or reverse the
flight from the central cities. Residency requirements can no longer
be examined in a narrow constitutional context alone; their signifi-
cance in the "urban crisis" cannot be ignored.
108. In Mogle v. Sevier County School Dist., 540 F.2d 478 (10th Cir. 1976), a
school counselor challenged a school district's residency requirement. Using the ra-
tionality test, the court decided that the reasons given for residency were related to the
counselor's role and were not wholly insubstantial. According to this court, the gen-
eral rule is that durational requirements are to be tested under strict scrutiny and
continuing residency under minimum scrutiny. Id. at 483.
109. See Andre v. Board of Trustees of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978); Mogle v. Sevier County School Dist., 540 F.2d 478
(10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977); Wardwell v. Board of Educ. of
City School Dist., 529 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1976); Wright v. City of Jackson, 506 F.2d
900 (5th Cir. 1975).
110. Contra, Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1972); Donnelly v.
City of Manchester, 111 N.H. 50, 274 A.2d 789 (1971).
111. See generally Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255 (1974);
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 636
(1969).
112. See notes 105-108 and accompanying text supra.
113. See, e.g., Andre v. Board of Trustees of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978); Mogle v. Sevier County School Dist., 540
F.2d 478 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977); Wright v. City of Jack-
son, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1975).
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VI. RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS AND CONTROL OF URBAN
GROWTH
Courts have examined the right to travel in many growth control
cases." Yet in each of the decisions dealing with time development
ordinances and exclusionary zoning, the challenged regulation at-
tempted to prevent population increases in a given municipality." 5
By comparison, the residency issue focuses on the constitutionality of
ordinances which may deter decreases in population.
Legal commentators unanimously support the invalidation of resi-
dency requirements, contending that such ordinances penalize an in-
dividual's exercise of his right to travel." 6  Examining the
employment relationship in isolation, commentators argue that mu-
nicipalities do not have the authority to impose conditions on em-
ployment which courts would not tolerate in the private sector.
Further, no municipal interest justifies interference with a nonresi-
dent's constitutional right to live and work where he chooses. Highly
qualified persons may prefer to live outside city limits; discrimination
against nonresidents and reduction of the labor pool may therefore
114. See. e.g., Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th
Cir 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of
Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972); Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30
N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003
(1972); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); Appeal of
Girsch, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa.
504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). See generally Amano, Selinger, Tekenaka, Van Dyke &
Young, Selected Constitutional Issues Related to Growth Management in the State of
Hawaii. 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 639 (1978); Durkee & Hayford, Residency Require-
ments in Local Government Employment: The Impact of the Public Employer's Duty to
Bargain, 29 LAB. L. 343 (1978); Note, Municipal Self-Determination: Must Local
Control of Growth Yield to Travel Rights? 17 ARIz. L. REv. 145 (1975); Note, Can an
"Inclusionarv" Land Use Plan Withstand a Right to Travel Challenge? 10 SUFFOLK L.
REV 623 (1976); Note, The Right to Travel and Municipal Land Use Planningfor Limi-
tation of Residential Development, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 234; Note, Tempo and Sequen-
tial Controls: The Validity f,4ttempts to Combat Urban Sprawl Through Local Land
Use Regulations, I 1 WILLAMETTE L.J. 217 (1975).
115. See generaly D. BROWER, D. GODSCHALK, L. MCBENNETr & B. VESTAL,
DEFINING THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES OF GROWTH MANAGEMENT (1976); Bigham
& Bostick, Exclusionary Zoning Practices- An Examination of the Current Contro-
verst, 25 VAND. L. REV. 1111 (1972); Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning,
Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969); Note, Exclusionary
Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1645 (1971); Comment, Exclusionary
Use of the Planned Unit Development.- Standardsfor Judicial Scrutiny, 8 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 394 (1973).
116. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
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be detrimental to the municipality's interests as an employer. Fi-
nally, regardless of a public employee's residence, he contributes to
the city through performance of his duties. 11"
In light of the decay of urban centers, the approach taken by the
commentators cannot stand. Commuting strains the city economi-
cally and culturally. Salaries earned in the city do not recirculate
there. Instead, commuters bestow financial benefits on surrounding
areas when satisfying their social and entertainment needs in their
own communities."' 8 Each of these factors has contributed to the de-
cline of the cities.
Since 1970, metropolitan areas have grown more slowly than the
nation as a whole, and substantially less rapidly than nonmetro-
politan America." 9 This development is contrary to all previously
existing patterns of metropolitan growth since the 1800's. Addition-
ally, both the largest metropolitan areas and the most distant periph-
eral counties have experienced reversals in migration trends. The
metropolitan regions with populations in excess of three million
gained migrants between 1960 and 1970 but have lost since 1970;12 °
the peripheral nonmetropolitan counties lost migrants between 1960
and 1970 but have gained since 1970. lz ' At present, there is no indi-
cation that this most recent urban pattern of rapid out-migration will
reverse itself.
From a practical standpoint, the chances of the city healing itself
seem nonexistent. The upper- and middle-class exodus 122 from the
urban areas has resulted in a significant change in the socioeconomic
117. See generaly Note, Residency Requirementsfor Municoal Employees: Denial
of a Right to Commute? 7 U.S.F. L. REV. 508 (1973); Comment, City Employment
Residency Requirements, 7 URBAN L. ANN. 414 (1974).
118. See generally URBAN AFFAIRS ANNUAL REVIEWS, URBANIZATION AND
COUNTER-URBANIZATION (B. Berry ed. 1976).
119. Berry, The Counterurbanization Process- Urban America Since 1970, in UR-
BANIZATION AND COUNTERURBANIZATION 19, 21 (B. Berry ed. 1976).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. St. Louis exemplifies the out-migration of middle- and upper-class city resi-
dents. Primarily young families with middle-level incomes from steady well-paid
jobs changed residences to the suburbs. Older persons tended to stay within the city
limits. In the meantime, the poor and unskilled, white and black alike, came to the
city from the South. For a general discussion of the changes in St. Louis' population
characteristics, see CITY PLAN COMMISSION, SAINT LoUIs DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
30-35 (1973). See generally Zelinsky, Cities & the Middle Class: Another Look at the
Urban Crisis, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 1081.
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profile of the typical city dweller.'23 In addition, substantial business
relocation to suburban areas has led to the precarious condition of
the cities. 124 The once vibrant centers of metropolitan living have
become pockets of self-perpetuating poverty. For whatever reasons,
Americans are abandoning city residences, preferring to commute
from outlying areas.125 Incentives must be provided to facilitate their
123. Again using St. Louis as an illustration, between 1960 and 1970, the popula-
tion decreased by 17%. At the same time, the percentage of blacks rose from 29% to
41%. Additionally, the city now has a high percentage of households with female
heads, 2 1% city-wide; an unusually high proportion of elderly residents (65 and over),
14.7- as contrasted to a national average of 9.8%; and a relatively high proportion of
households living in poverty, 26.5% as contrasted to a national average of 19.1%. Fur-
ther, the city has experienced a massive out-migration of family heads in the "produc-
tive years" of 19 to 54. CITY PLAN COMMISSION, SAINT Louis DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAM at 32-33 (1973). See generally Note, So You Want to Move to the Suburbs:
Pokcr Formulation and the Constiiutionalir of Municipal Growth-Restricting Plans, 3
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 803 (1976).
124. See generaly Langsdorf, Urban Decal; Propertv Tax Delinquency.4 Solu-
tion in St. Louis, 5 URB. LAW 729 (1973); Marshall, Flight of the Thrft Institution.-
One More Invitation to Inner City Disaster, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 113 (1974); Financial
Institutions Municipal Finance & Community Development. Special Symposium Issue,
29 VAND. L. REV. 901 (1976); Note, Urban Redevelopment & the Fiscal Crisis of the
Central City, 21 ST. Louis U.L.J. 820 (1978).
125. St. Louis exemplifies the out-migration of middle- and upper-class city resi-
dents Primarily young families with middle income from steady well-paying jobs
changed residences to the suburbs. Older persons tended to stay within the city limits.
Poor and unskilled whites and blacks came to the city from the South. For a general
discussion of the changes in St. Louis' population characteristics, see CITY PLAN
COMMISSION, SAINT Louis DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, 30-35 (1973). See generally
Zelnsky, Cities & the Middle Class: Another Look at the Urban Crisis, 1975 Wis. L.
REV 1081.
Preliminary reports by the United States Bureau of the Census indicate that
2,385,500 persons were living in the metropolitan area as of July 1, 1979. See Kester,
Population Drop Continues Here, St. L. Post-Dispatch, June 13, 1979, at 8b, col. 3.
The St. Louis metropolitan area has experienced a net population decline of one per-
cent in the last eight years. Since 1970, approximately 142,600 persons moved out of
the area. This figure is somewhat misleading, however, for it includes a natural in-
crease of 117300 (306,100 births and 188,800 deaths of area residents) to produce the
one percent loss.
From 1970 to 1977, St. Louis City's population declined 17% compared to the 4.6%
decline for all central cities in metropolitan areas in America. St. Louis County also
experienced a decline in the last eight years with 21,600 more persons moving out of
rather than into the County. Id. at col. 6. This net out-migration in the St. Louis area
is partially attributed to the slow growth of jobs. "From 1970 to [1976], employment
in the area increased only 7 percent, compared with a national gain of 20 percent."
Id. at col. 3. Another cause cited is the movement of retired workers to areas with
lower costs of living and more attractive climates. Id.
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return.126
Consistent with urban redevelopment attempts to bring new fami-
lies, new or renewed loyalties, and new financial resources to the cit-
ies, courts must uphold municipal residency requirements. Public
employment continues to be a valuable deterrent to those who wish
to leave the city and a stimulus for those contemplating a move
within city limits. 127 Both urban and suburban dwellers must recog-
nize that the effects of a declining city tax base, increased welfare
burdens, inadequate housing, poor-quality schools, the threat of mu-
nicipal insolvency and increasing crime rates do not stop at the city
limits.128 Indeed, when examining residency under equal protection
challenges, the courts should now look to the decline in city popula-
tion and economic indicators for the requisite rational relationship.
In those courts that accept the right of intrastate travel as fundamen-
tal, urban decay should now satisfy the search for a compelling gov-
ernmental interest.
Judicial acceptance of controlling the cities' decline as a compel-
ling governmental interest is critical in the success of public employ-
ment as an incentive to live in the city. Courts confronted with
residency will no longer be required to sidestep the holding of Sha-
piro by confining the fundamental right to travel to durational resi-
dence only. Even if courts expand the ill-defined right to travel to
encompass intrastate migration, these compelling interests will justify
municipal residency requirements.
VII. CONCLUSION
Many municipal governments enacted residency requirements long
before rapid out-migration and decay crippled the urban centers.12 9
As a consequence, the motives of the municipality in establishing
126. See generally Note, From Plows to Pliers: Urban Homesteading in America, 2
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 273 (1974); Note, Urban Homesteading in the Frontier of the
American City, 36 LA. L. RE,. 233 (1975).
127. In St. Louis, for example, more than 50% of the Civil Service applicants in
1976 were county residents at the time of their examinations. As a condition of their
employment, they must relocate into the city. Interview with G. Fox, Assistant Per-
sonnel Director for the City of St. Louis, Missouri (Feb. 14, 1978).
128. See generally NATIONAL URBAN COALITION, THE STATE OF THE CITIES 65-
90 (1972).
129. For an excellent survey of the 50 largest cities as well as when and why they
enacted residence requirements, see Note, Municipal Employee Residence Require-
ments and Equal Protection, 84 YALE L.J. 1684, 1684-89 (1974).
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these provisions may bear little resemblance to the rationale available
today to justify these requirements. 130 For example, at one time mu-
nicipalities could persuasively argue that forcing police and firemen
to live within city limits was necessary due to the emergency nature
of their work.' 3 ' Today, however, this geographical proximity theory
has less merit. With modem transportation systems, commuting
from suburb to city may actually consume less time than intra-city
travel alone.
This same evolution of interests actually increases the legitimacy of
residency provisions. When searching for a compelling interest to
sustain any law, courts limit their inquiries to present interests, not
those which may or may not have surrounded the law initially.' 32
Upon challenge of these ordinances, then, the city could urge "urban
health" as a compelling state interest which would satisfy either equal
protection test. This municipal philosophy clearly incorporates all of
the earlier contentions: city familiarity, proximity, mutual financial
support, psychological disengagement per Krzewinski, and reduction
of residents' unemployment.
Many other concerns, however, exist in this urban decay frame-
work that emphasize the "compelling" nature of mandatory resi-
dence. First, many intangible interests are at stake as a city
deteriorates; the urban core experiences cultural and historic ramifi-
cations.133 Second, there is a probability that the central cities will
become densely populated with persons dependent on public assist-
ance.' 3 4 Additionally, as residential blight and unemployment in-
130 Some courts believe that the earliest residency requirements were designed to
legitimize the patronage already inherent in civil service. See, e.g., Krzewinski v.
Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492, 502 (D.N.J. 1972).
131 See. e.g., Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 385 Mich. 519, 190
N.W.2d 97 (1971), appeal dismissedfor lack of substantial federal question, 405 U.S.
950 (1972), Hattiesburg Firefighters Local 184 v. City of Hattiesburg, 263 So. 2d 767
(Miss. 1972); Salt Lake City Fire Fighters Local 1645 v. Salt Lake City, 22 Utah 2d
115, 449 P.2d 239, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
132 For example, Sunday closing laws have been upheld when the legitimate
objective of providing a uniform day of rest was not initially the aim of the law, and
when in fact the objective at the time of enactment was proscribed by the establish-
ment and free exercise clauses of the Constitution. See Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599 (1961). McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
133 See generally A. DOWNS, URBAN PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (2d ed. 1976);
D. ROGERS, MANAGEMENT OF BIG CITIES: INTERESTS GROUPS AND SOCIAL
CHANGE STRATEGIES (1971).
134 For an excellent summary and survey of welfare recipients in the central
cities, see J. PRESSMAN, FEDERAL PROGRAMS AND CITY POLITICS (1975).
1980]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
crease, crime rates may rise.'35 Inevitable problems with education
and other public services also arise.' 36 Surely, all these factors could
convince a court that compelling governmental interests support pub-
lic employment as an incentive to live in the city.
Too often it seems that municipal employees asking the court to
protect the constitutional right they voluntarily relinquished are not
being truthful in their objections to mandatory residence. Instead,
many are reacting to the fear of nearby poverty, minority neighbors,
and the stigma attached to being a city dweller when upward mobil-
ity demands suburban residence. Fortunately for the cities, the
courts need never defend these self-centered interests. Constitutional
rights that have been contractually surrendered for the mutual benefit
of employer and employee should no longer result in a successful
challenge to residency.
135. Professor Downs suggests a direct correlation between rising crime rates and
urban blight. A. DowNs, URBAN PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (2d ed. 1976). See also
A. BRANDSTETTER & L. RADELET, POLICE AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS: A
SOURCEBOOK (1968).
136. See generally C. ADRIAN & C. PRESS, HUMAN SERVICES IN CITIES (1977).
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